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Abstract
This article argues that, at a tactical level, loyalist terrorism in the Irish border region 
between 1972 and 1974 worked. Cross-border attacks including bombings in Irish towns and 
the targeting of IRA safe-houses prompted the Irish government to reinforce security along 
the border – a long-standing loyalist demand. The loyalist campaign prompted the IRA to 
embark on an effort to punish those who were believed to have passed information to 
loyalists, resulting in the killing in an Irish Protestant senator and widespread condemnation 
of the organisation in the Republic of Ireland. However, short-term gains were outweighed 
by a growing perception among Catholic nationalists that the British state tolerated or even 
colluded in such attacks, undermining the British Army’s campaign to gain trust (and 
information) within the Catholic population of Northern Ireland. The article also contends 
that middle-class loyalists played an important role in mobilising and equipping loyalist 
paramilitary organisations. It concludes that the British Army showed an excessive tolerance 
of loyalists with political capital or ties to the security forces, despite evidence that such 
individuals were directly supporting the activities of loyalist paramilitaries. 
Loyalist Mobilisation, Elite Networks and Border Violence in Rural Ulster 1972-1974
In January 1972, during the most violent period of Northern Ireland’s Troubles, an Irish 
military officer wrote an intelligence report that suggested that the British Army was 
withdrawing from some western parts of the border between Northern Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland. The Irish officer concluded that the British Army was “creating a DMZ 
[demilitarized zone] one mile from the border.”1 On March 1 a Provisional Irish Republican 
Army (IRA) unit abducted Johnny Fletcher, a part-time soldier in the Ulster Defence 
Regiment (UDR) from his County Fermanagh border farm, before shooting him dead in a 
nearby field. A few days later UDR headquarters instructed a number of part-time soldiers to 
move out of the border area near where Johnny Fletcher was killed.2 In border areas with 
sizeable Protestant minorities fears of an imminent British withdrawal were particularly 
acute. John Taylor, a former Northern Ireland cabinet minister with responsibility for security 
at the Ministry of Home Affairs (1970-1972) warned that, if their political opponents were 
successful, “… the average Protestant small farmer and the worker would be squeezed out the 
same as happened in Eire [sic]” after the foundation of the Irish state in 1922.3  As a 
response, influential figures in mainstream Unionism, including former members of the 
Northern Irish government, came to support loyalist paramilitary activity as a desperate 
response to a deteriorating situation.4
This article poses three connected questions. First, why did rural cross-border loyalist activity 
suddenly escalate between 1972 and 1974? Second, did local political and business elites in 
rural areas direct and enable significant loyalist paramilitary activity, including through 
relationships with representatives of the state and through links to more working-class 
paramilitary groups? Third, did loyalist terrorism and political violence work? Anthony 
Craig5, Shaun McDaid6, Thomas Leahy7 and Patrick Mulroe8 have already noted a 
determined effort by both the Irish and the UK governments to deepen security cooperation 
in response to IRA violence. An increase in resources and intelligence-sharing led to more 
arrests, substantially degrading the IRA’s operational capacity on both sides of the border.9 
However, the conduct and effect of the loyalist border campaign has received less attention. 
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The article responds to the call by Richard English for more empirical research on the 
“difficult question” of the efficacy of terrorism.10 Moreover, while significant attention has 
been paid to terrorism as practiced by active or would-be insurgents, much less study has 
been focused on terrorists who wish to suppress rather than bring about significant political 
change.11 The loyalist argument was that their own violation of the law was a temporary 
aberration or emergency that would end when unionist majority rule in Ulster was once again 
secure. As an Ulster loyalist on trial for murder during another period of violence in 1922 
observed: “I, Sir, may have broken the law but it was to assist the Crown Forces in my own 
way.”12
 
In analysing the political impact of loyalist border violence from 1972-1974, this article 
draws upon English’s definition of terrorism;
Terrorism involves heterogeneous violence used or threatened with a political aim; it 
can involve a variety of acts, of targets, and of actors; it possesses an important 
psychological dimension, producing terror or fear among a directly threatened group 
and also a wider implied audience in the hope of maximizing political communication 
and achievement; it embodies the exerting and implementing of power, and the 
attempted redressing of power-relations; it represents a subspecies of warfare, and as 
such it can form part of a wider campaign of violent and non-violent attempts at 
political leverage.13
The observation by English that terrorism may serve as one tool in a wider campaign of 
exerting political influence is instructive. The loyalist border campaign of 1972-1974 was not 
especially deadly, at least compared to that of the IRA. However, the impact of the wider 
mobilisation of loyalist paramilitary networks in rural areas was considerable, putting 
pressure on the security forces, including when it came to the question of infiltration.
There has been a notable neglect of the study of rural loyalism during the Troubles. In a 
recent book, Brian Hanley describes a number of loyalist attacks in the border areas. 
However, Hanley’s work is concentrated on the impact of the Troubles in the Republic of 
Ireland, rather than the whole island.14 Meanwhile, Henry Patterson’s work does not focus on 
loyalist bombings and assassinations in the rural, border region. Patterson’s contribution is 
overwhelmingly concerned with republican violence and the British-Irish security 
relationship.15 Elsewhere, the activities of the loyalist ‘Glenanne Gang’ and the ‘murder 
triangle’ between east Tyrone, north and mid-Armagh have been widely covered. However, 
even here most of the leaders of loyalist paramilitary groups operating in this area lived in 
and operated around large towns like Portadown in County Armagh and Dungannon in 
County Tyrone.16 A focus on urban loyalist violence is of course understandable. The 
majority of loyalist attacks were planned and carried out in urban areas.17 Steve Bruce has 
described loyalism as being an entirely working class phenomenon, writing that, “working 
class unionists – loyalists, as they are more often known – were willing to go further than 
others and believed it both necessary and right to use violence (or at least prepare to be in a 
position to use violence) to defeat nationalism.”18 It is true, as Bruce and others such as 
James McAuley and Richard Reed have described, that the explosion of recruitment to 
loyalist groups in the early 1970s was concentrated in working-class urban areas. Such 
recruitment was commensurate with the spike of IRA violence between 1971 and 1973 and 
resentment over the introduction of direct rule and fears over power-sharing negotiations and 
a role for the Irish government in Northern Ireland’s affairs.19 
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Nonetheless, Amy Grubb has observed the absence of scholarship on loyalist networks in 
rural Ulster, despite a sharp rise in rural, sectarian violence in Ulster relative to population.20  
As Stathis Kalyvas has observed, class structures, relationships and social values can often 
differ markedly between the urban and rural setting of even a small place like Ulster, 
impacting upon a pattern of violence.21 Contrary to Bruce’s assertion, Henry McDonald and 
Jim Cusack have briefly noted that paramilitary leaders in rural areas were often from a 
middle rather than a working-class background, which impacted upon their relationships with 
the state.22 Here I argue that class matters: it is not possible, for example, to understand the 
British Army’s indulgence of the leadership of a loyalist group like Down Orange Welfare 
(DOW) without at least some understanding of the social backgrounds of its leading 
members. 
This article also examines how the state interacted with loyalist networks in rural areas. Mark 
McGovern has put the case for a broad definition of collusion, namely
…the involvement of state agents (members of the police, army, prison and 
intelligence services) or state officials (government ministers, legal officers, civil 
servants), directly or indirectly, through commission, omission, collaboration or 
connivance, with armed non-state groups or agents, in wrongful acts usually (although 
not exclusively) involving or related to non-state political violence and extrajudicial 
killing.23
If applied too widely, the concept of collusion can suggest more uniformity than was the 
case, giving a picture of institutional coherence instead of confusion or even chaos and 
ineptitude. It also risks placing the structure of the state and institution above the individual 
agency or autonomy of the soldier or police officer, suggesting that atrocity or criminality 
were an automatic or a reflexive feature of the institution rather than the choice of an 
individual, or a small group of individuals. Deviance is normalised, instead of being put in its 
proper, exceptional context.24 This article suggests that, although acts that meet McGovern’s 
definition of collusion did take place (and some are discussed here for the first time), 
individual agency at a junior level could be a critical if not determining factor in those events. 
The following discussion of rural loyalism is broken down into two principal sections. First, 
in order to appreciate the political and social networks that sustained grass-roots loyalist 
activity, this article will particularly focus on the counties of Fermanagh and Down, which 
have been largely omitted from studies of loyalism during the Troubles. In the case of County 
Down the relatively forgotten paramilitary organization, DOW, is outlined, including its 
relationship with the state and the more working-class Ulster Defence Association (UDA) 
and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). Unlike another military veterans’ paramilitary group 
tolerated by the state, the Catholic Ex-Servicemen’s Association (CESA), DOW had a large 
arsenal of weapons and acted as an armorer to other paramilitary organizations, including 
those from the town of Portadown who were operating in the West Ulster border area.25 
Secondly, the article goes on to evaluate the effect of the overlooked cross-border loyalist 
border campaign that occurred on the County Fermanagh border with the Republic of Ireland 
between 1972 and 1974. It argues that this loyalist campaign was successful in its immediate, 
tactical objectives, eliminating IRA safe-houses and weapons. More importantly loyalist 
attacks also provoked an increase in the Irish security presence along the border (a long-
standing loyalist demand) and an IRA counter-intelligence initiative with damaging results 
for the Republican movement. However, loyalist activity south of the border, including the 
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murder of two teenagers, hardened suspicions about collusion with the state, inflicting long-
term damage to the British government’s aim of lowering tensions and winning trust in the 
border region. 
The period under discussion is from the outset of 1972, the most violent year of the Troubles, 
to the IRA’s killing of an Irish senator, Billy Fox on March 12 1974 – the same month that 
Conservative Party leader Ted Heath resigned as Britain’s prime minister and a new Labour 
government took office. Finally, given the social fluidity of the border region, including an 
enduring 20th century legacy of unionist-loyalist ties south of the border in Cavan, Donegal 
and Monaghan, nine-county Ulster is proposed as a more appropriate geographical area for a 
treatment and discussion of rural loyalism than merely six-county Northern Ireland.
‘You are in a War Situation’: Rural Loyalist Mobilisation and the State
In the spring of 1972, as the IRA came under increased pressure in urban areas, its leaders 
decided to shift the momentum of the armed campaign to the border region. The British 
Army had concentrated its operations in the cites and large towns; in the border counties the 
IRA had the operational space it needed to launch surprise attacks from the south against 
regular and part-time soldiers and police officers.26 3rd Infantry Brigade (3 Brigade), with its 
headquarters in Lurgan, had th  task of securing approximately 250 miles of the border. 
However, its battalions were principally deployed to large towns such as Armagh, 
Portadown, Dungannon and Newry.27 In addition to its presence in urban areas, 3 Brigade did 
not have sufficient resources to police a border area that included hundreds of unapproved 
crossings. In July 1972, the most violent month of the Troubles, there were less than 250 
regular soldiers in County Fermanagh, with responsibility for patrolling 135 miles of border 
in addition to other tasks in the county. Despite the constant cratering of roads along the 
border, which enraged much of the majority nationalist, Catholic population, IRA attacks on 
part-time UDR soldiers and the bombing of Protestant-owned businesses in border towns 
quickly escalated during the summer and autumn of 1972.28 
Rising IRA violence along the border stirred a loyalist response. In October 1972 3,000 
loyalists, including members of paramilitary groups such as the UDA, the UVF, the Loyalist 
Association of Workers (LAW) and the Ulster Special Constabulary Association (USCA) 
gathered beside the police station in the town of Enniskillen to hear accounts of recent 
loyalist cross-border raids into the Republic of Ireland.29 The UDA and DOW were closely 
associated with former Northern Irish Home Affairs minister William Craig’s Vanguard 
movement – a militant organization which formed its own parami itary unit, the Vanguard 
Service Corps. Leading Ulster Unionists in the border counties were also sympathetic to 
Vanguard and the broader loyalist paramilitary movement. In March 1972 the West Ulster 
Unionist Association expressed “strong and unanimous support for the Ulster Vanguard 
Movement.”30 In the summer of that year, John Brooke, the Chairman of Fermanagh County 
Council and a former Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) government minister, claimed that all 
Unionists in west Ulster were now united with Vanguard.31 In a speech in the town of 
Enniskillen, Brooke’s father and former prime minister of Northern Ireland, Viscount 
Brookeborough, recalled an earlier conflict (the Anglo-Irish War of 1919-1921) when he 
founded a paramilitary organization, Fermanagh Vigilance, before later taking command of 
the auxiliary police unit, the Ulster Special Constabulary (USC). While advising young 
loyalists to join the UDR and take the fight to the IRA, he also praised unnamed “other 
bodies” who he said were doing “good work”.32  Other Ulster Unionist representatives were 
more explicit in their support for loyalist paramilitary operations in the Republic of Ireland. 
In the autumn of 1972 John Taylor thanked “… God for the imagination of the people who 
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had the wisdom to form organizations like the LAW and the UDA ...” Taylor also stated that 
he supported the UDA going across the border and “rooting out” the IRA, arguing that 
loyalist cross-border bombings “have been an advantage to Northern Ireland security.”33 
Vanguard leader Bill Craig also praised the UDA, claiming that loyalists had “no regrets” in 
hitting back at the Republic of Ireland.34
British government officials were also considering ways to respond to the escalating IRA 
border campaign. Garda sources had informed the British Army that it was difficult to secure 
convictions against leading IRA men; senior members of the Irish judiciary could be very 
sympathetic to the IRA. In March 1972 the Ministry of Defence (MOD) considered the 
option of covert, cross-border raids south of the border to target IRA Active Service Units 
(ASUs).35 Meanwhile, the British Army was increasingly concerned about the loyalties of the 
UDR and those of the Northern Irish police, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). In a 
memorandum sent to the commanding officers of battalions in the 3 Brigade area of 
operations (AO), Brigadier Peter Bush pointed out that, while countering loyalist violence 
was principally a RUC responsibility, there were a number of “serious weaknesses which 
cannot be ignored: a) Some lack the resolve to deal with extremist Protestants …; b) some are 
intimidated by the extremists … c) some are penetrated by the Protestant extremist 
organisations and many of them sympathise with militant Protestant aims; d) they are very 
short of high-grade CID officers and efficient administrators.” Bush observed that the 
publication of the British government’s white paper on power-sharing in Northern Ireland 
would mean a “difficult period when [RUC] loyalties are strained.”36 He also estimated that 
up to 300 UDR (approximately 10 per cent) of part-time soldiers in 3 Brigade’s AO were 
members of militant Protestant organisations. 3 Brigade’s commander predicted a scaling up 
of loyalist attacks along the border but he had few answers about how to respond to the 
coming campaign beyond a “weeding out” of paramilitary elements over time.37 In the 
summer of 1972 Bush sent a directive to all units serving under his command instructing 
them to “to avoid, to the greatest extent possible, confrontation with the Protestant 
community.” It was clear to Bush that an over-stretched 3 Brigade could not cope with 
additional security duties such as a major confrontation with the UDA.38
Respected businessmen, farmers and former police officers played pivotal roles in 
establishing and running loyalist paramilitary units in rural Ulster. British military 
intelligence claimed that a key loyalist paramilitary organiser in Tyrone was a prominent 
businessman (later arrested on an explosives charge).39 In Fermanagh, Basil Anderson, a 
former RUC officer in Enniskillen who had also served in the Royal Air Force, worked to set 
up a coalition of paramilitary organisations under the banner of Ulster Vanguard. Anderson’s 
Loyalist Defence Volunteers included leading UDA and USCA figures in the county.40 
Former UDR soldier, George Farrell, who was convicted in relation to his role in a bomb 
attack in Pettigo on 28 September 1973 and claimed to be both a member of the UVF and the 
UDA, named five other loyalists at his trial who he claimed were involved in operations, 
including a well-known Fermanagh businessman.41 Meanwhile, prominent serving UDR 
officer, such as Lieutenant Colonel George Saunderson, second-in-command of 4th Battalion, 
UDR (County Fermanagh), was a leading member of the USCA which had morphed into a 
vigilante group with close ties to paramilitary organisations like the UDA.42
DOW has generally been overlooked in the historiography of the Troubles, possibly because 
the organisation did not claim any victims. DOW was led by Peter Brush, a septuagenarian 
former army officer who had served as a young lieutenant in the Rifle Brigade in Dublin and 
west Ulster during operations against the IRA in 1920 and 1921. Brush retired from the army 
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in 1946 and returned to the family estate at Drumnabreeze, County Down, a few miles 
outside the town of Lurgan. He later served as a High Sheriff, Deputy and Vice Lord 
Lieutenant of County Down, entertaining the Queen and the royal family during their visits to 
Northern Ireland. He was also chairman of the County Down Territorial Army (TA) 
Association and Northern Ireland’s representative to the Executive Committee of the TA.43 
According to Brush, in 1971 he was approached by the grand master of the Orange Order in 
Down, who asked him to form a paramilitary organisation, one that would ensure that if the 
security situation in Northern Ireland deteriorated significantly, unionists in the county 
“would have a cadre of men ready to meet the unforeseen.”44 Through his former and 
existing army and police contacts in the county, he formed ‘battalions’, including one in 
North Down commanded by ‘Colonel’ Bill Hannigan. Hannigan lived in the coastal village 
of Donaghadee on the Ards Peninsula where he also served in the RUC Reserve.45 A former 
warrant officer in the Royal Irish Fusiliers, he was awarded the Military Medal for bravery in 
Aden.46 The intelligence officer for DOW, who lived near the village of Saintfield, served in 
a military intelligence role during the Cyprus Emergency of the 1950s.47 
In April 1973 a British Army intelligence report noted that DOW had begun arms and 
explosives training. In August, military intelligence officers estimated that DOW’s 
membership stood at somewhere between 1,000 and 1,800 members. The following month 
the Army suspected that DOW may have been behind a weapons factory that was discovered 
near Killinchy along with 241 partially or fully manufactured mortars, until then the largest 
arms find in Northern Ireland’s history.48   Throughout this period of paramilitary activity, 
Brush maintained his position as president of the Ulster Unionist Association of South Down; 
Herbert Heslip, also a farmer and a leading figure in DOW, was a member of the Northern 
Ireland Assembly.49 Occasional meetings were held between the security forces and DOW to 
discuss the latter’s intentions. Military intelligence officers recorded Bill Hannigan’s 
“friendly” attitude, noting that he showed off his DOW lieutenant colonel’s uniform, while 
simultaneously stressing “DOW’s intention of cooperating with the Security Forces.”50 
In intelligence reports compiled in the spring and summer of 1973, officers in 3 Brigade 
concluded that DOW posed no threat to security in Northern Ireland.51 Yet by December of 
that year 3 Brigade intelligence indicated that DOW had “joined the loyalist camp” and had 
“dispersed all their illegally held weapons”.52 Despite mounting evidence that the 
organisation was working closely with the UDA and the UVF, the British government and 
the military largely ignored the organisation.53 By early 1974 Colonel Brush formed a 
working relationship with UDA leader Andy Tyrie and 3 Brigade intelligence reported that a 
well-known UDA commander in County Down now described DOW as the UDA’s “sister 
organisation”.54 DOW later joined the UVF and the Red Hand Commando in the Ulster 
Loyalist Central Coordinating Committee as part of the militant response to the Sunningdale 
Agreement in December 1973. The agreement established a short-lived power-sharing 
executive, assembly and included an advisory role for the Irish government in Northern 
Ireland’s affairs. Paramilitary organisations such as the UDA, UVF, USCA and DOW played 
an important role in mobilising the Ulster Workers’ Council strike in May 1974 that 
collapsed these institutions.55 
On November 10 1978 the RUC discovered a Harrison M300 lathe, used for turning gun 
barrels, at a farm on the Ards Pensinsula in the north of County Down; 14 weapons, 37 
magazines and 480 bullets were also seized by the police. Bill Hannigan, who was later 
described in court as the “the prime party in the offences”, was arrested along with William 
Lightbody, a member of the UVF in north Down and four other men, including the owner of 
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the farm, John Steele. Hannigan, Lightbody and Steele were all charged and convicted of 
illegally manufacturing weapons over a period of more than a year and a half. A former RUC 
Reserve officer, Samuel McCullough, was also convicted in relation to weapons offences. 
When police officers searched Hannigan’s home near Donaghadee, they found a further eight 
guns, five magazines, gun parts and 1,017 rounds of assorted ammunition.56 Hannigan, who 
was described as a leading member of DOW at his trial, was given a 16 years sentence for a 
number of offences, including conspiring to illegally manufacture sub-machine guns; 
Lightbody was given a total of 12 years for firearms related offences and for membership of 
the UVF.57 During the course of the investigation Hannigan named a senior Belfast UDA 
commander, who he claimed first approached DOW during the Ulster Worker’s Council 
strike in 1974 to discuss finding a suitable location for the lathe. Hannigan arranged the 
delivery of the lathe to Steele’s farm and subsequently took charge, together with 
representatives from the UDA and the UVF, of a large-scale arms manufacturing and 
maintenance operation in the area. William Lightbody and Bill Hannigan also later related 
how they travelled to Portadown to collect arms from loyalists there. No prosecutions were 
brought against two prominent UDA commanders named by Hannigan as playing a key role 
in the affair.58
The north Down brigade of the UVF later erected a mural to Hannigan and nine other “fallen 
comrades” in the town of Newtownards. The next name after Hannigan’s is that of William 
Lightbody.59 After Hannigan’s conviction, Colonel Brush petitioned unsuccessfully to the 
Northern Ireland Office (NIO) for “… a Queen’s pardon for this old soldier”. An irritated 
Brush later wrote that “… Lord Gowrie replied to me through a secretary that he was unable 
to help.”60 Nevertheless, in the summer of 1980, barely six months after Hannigan’s 
conviction, military headquarters in Northern Ireland organised a party in Brush’s honour to 
celebrate the 60th anniversary since his commissioning as an officer in the British Army. The 
event was hosted in Lisburn by the Commander Land Forces Northern Ireland, Major 
General James Glover and the Commander of 39 Brigade, Brigadier David Ramsbotham.61 
Such an indulgent attitude to DOW’s leader was consistent with the security forces’ 
relationship with the paramilitary organisation during the decade or so of its existence. 
DOW’s leaders were almost all ex-British Army and/or UUP. It was essentially treated as a 
respectable paramilitary organisation. But, as the army and the RUC knew from 1973 
onwards, the separation of DOW from the UVF and UDA was far from clear-cut. Not only 
did Brush work closely with the UDA and UVF leadership, but a senior DOW leader, Bill 
Hannigan, oversaw the manufacturing of weapons for the UDA and the UVF. DOW may not 
have carried out its own paramilitary attacks, but its leadership was willing to arm and equip 
those that did. As will also become evident in the next section on the loyalist campaign across 
the border in Monaghan and Cavan, paramilitaries cannot function effectively without an 
armourer - somebody to build and service weapons - and local intelligence. 
Loyalist Intelligence and Cross-Border Raids
Seek and Destroy: Loyalist Operations in County Monaghan
A sustained loyalist cross-border campaign in County Monaghan in late 1973/early 1974 
began with an attack on November 10 on a house just outside the town of Clones in County 
Monaghan. During the preceding months the security forces had identified a suspected IRA 
safe house at ‘Four Ash Trees’ crossroads in the townland of Legnakelly, a mile or so from 
the border.  Intelligence received by the British Army alleged that Noel Thornbury, originally 
from Lurgan in County Armagh but who now resided in the house, was the Officer 
Commanding (OC) of the IRA ASU in the Clones area.62 Another British intelligence report 
indicated that a leading member of the IRA Army Council, Dáithí Ó Conaill, regularly met 
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with Thornbury at the house in Legnakelly, suggesting its importance as a de facto command 
centre for the IRA in the area. In late October 1973 British Army intelligence officers 
reported that Kevin McKenna, then believed to be in command of IRA operations in 
Fermanagh and Tyrone, may have been staying in the house. He had previously been 
observed in the vicinity of Legnakelly in May.63 MOD officials were concerned that a Garda 
sergeant in Clones, Paschal McArdle, was deliberately frustrating attempts to arrest 
McKenna, Thornbury and other senior IRA volunteers in the Clones area. RUC Chief 
Inspector Harry Currie met with McArdle but found him to be evasive: “McArdle was seen to 
visit Four Ash Trees frequently but when pressed always replied that there was nothing of 
interest there.”64 
Shortly before midnight on 10 November 1973 a group of eight armed men in two cars 
crossed the border. They drove to the Thornbury house where, masked and armed, they 
entered the back door of the house. There they found Noel Thornbury and his wife Stephanie 
in the kitchen with three unidentified men. Some of the loyalist gunmen went upstairs with 
Stephanie Thornbury where they searched the bedrooms and told her that her husband would 
be shot.65 Downstairs other members of the group assaulted the four men before planting a 
bomb with a fuse attached and forcing the men and Stephanie Thornbury outside.66 The 
gunmen told the men that they were going to be shot and directed them to a shed at the back 
of the house. At this point Noel Thornbury and his companions broke free from their would-
be executioners and ran in the direction of the fields at the rear of the house. Thornbury was 
shot in the back and, although badly injured, made it to a neighbours’ house belonging to the 
O’Hart family. The O’Harts called for a doctor and Thornbury ultimately survived following 
treatment in Monaghan hospital. The other three men in the house also escaped.67 Another 
neighbour, Seán Kinsella, a local republican who lived across the road from the Thornbury 
house, opened fire on the escaping gunmen as they drove away. The house was completely 
destroyed in the subsequent explosion.68 
A few miles west of Clones lies the Drummully salient, an incongruous few square miles of 
Monaghan that juts into Northern Ireland. The isolation of the area, and its proximity to 
potential targets in Northern Ireland, meant that the area was particularly favoured by the 
IRA as a staging post for cross-border raids. British Army intelligence reports in late 1973 
pointed to the IRA using several houses in the Drummully area, including a large, 
unoccupied Georgian manor, Clonoony House.69 The relative absence of Gardaí and the Irish 
Defence Forces, whose principal route into the area is by concession roads in Northern 
Ireland, was noted by the security forces and loyalists. Both did not remain idle in the face of 
such a growing IRA threat in Drummully. After a Monaghan republican, Phil McDonald, was 
arrested and charged with the possession of an unlicensed revolver, his house in the 
Drummully salient was searched and ransacked.70 Gardaí investigating reports of unusual 
activity in the area discovered RUC Chief Inspector Harry Currie at the McDonald property. 
According to the Irish government, Currie was “a wanted man in the eyes of the IRA, 
allegedly for shooting at some civilians”. Des O’Malley, the Irish Minister for Justice, later 
issued “a friendly warning” to the British ambassador about Currie’s conduct, since the Irish 
government did not want a shooting incident between the RUC and the IRA in the Republic 
of Ireland.71 
On 19 December 1973 John Brooke, now 2nd Viscount Brookeborough after the death of his 
father in August, made a speech in the House of Lords describing how he had recently 
travelled to see an IRA “camp”, just across the border in County Monaghan. There Brooke 
observed, “… two ‘boyos’ run back across the border. The house was 50 yards from the 
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Border … We know that this house exists; surely the Dublin Government knows it. In fact, 
we know they do, because the security forces know it and they have been in touch.72 Three 
days later, on the night of 22 December, a bomb exploded in an unoccupied farmhouse a few 
yards from thje broder, in Clonrye, a townland in Drummully, County Monaghan. Gardaí 
later found five rifles, 437 rounds of ammunition, combat gear, face masks, some explosives 
material and a map of the Newtownbutler area underneath the debris.73 A British Army 
intelligence report on the incident commented that: “There have been previous reports of 
explosives being present in a derelict house on the EIRE [sic] side of the border. The Gardai 
[sic] had previously searched every house in the area except the one with the explosives in, 
hence the explosion on the 22 Dec 73 and subsequent arms find.”74 On 24 December 1973 an 
Irish Army patrol under the command of Lieutenant Edge went to the scene of the explosion. 
At the lane leading up to the farm Lt. Edge encountered RUC Chief Inspector Harry Currie in 
an unmarked car. Both Currie and another plainclothes RUC officer denied that they had 
come to see the destroyed farmhouse but did not say why they were south of the border.75 
On 5 January 1974, Phil McDonald’s house was burned down. The next day Clonoony House 
was also targeted and burned to the ground. By now loyalists had successfully targeted four 
suspected IRA safehouses or staging points in the Clones/Drummully area. On 30 January the 
Irish Army defused another bomb at a fifth house, also in Clonoony. This bomb marked the 
end of a three-month period of loyalist operations in the Clones/Drummully area of 
Monaghan, including the attempted murder of Sinn Féin councillor Frank McCaughey in a 
bomb attack on his employer’s meat processing factory in Clones on 25 January.76 The range 
of reports received by the British Army – and varying grades allocated to informants -  
appear to indicate that intelligence officers had other sources, beyond the Irish police and 
army, when it came to IRA activity in the Clones area of Monaghan. Former USC and 
serving UDR officers also had long-established ties with the area. The intelligence officer of 
the UDR in County Fermanagh, Major Albert Liddle, was a member of Clones Masonic 
Lodge. Samuel Hutchinson, a former sub-commandant of the USC in the south-east of 
Fermanagh (not far from Clones) and an Unionist Unity candidate in 1973, had close family 
ties with Legnakelly; his family owned a farm in the same townland as Noel Thornbury/the 
Kinsellas and he himself served as a senior member of the Royal Black Preceptory – a 
traditionally Unionist, loyal institution - in that part of Monaghan.77 If the security forces 
could maintain such ties to Monaghan, so could loyalists who wished to take the war across 
the border to the IRA. Indeed, UDA representatives claimed that they had set up an 
intelligence network south of the border to monitor republicans, which was instrumental in a 
raid on an IRA arms dump near Redhills in County Cavan on the night of 5 October 1972.78 
For the IRA, loyalist intelligence south of the border appeared to be worryingly accurate (as 
in the case of Clonrye). Their response was disastrous. Members of the County Monaghan 
IRA believed that a local Protestant man, George Coulson, was responsible for providing 
intelligence to loyalists, which led to the attack on the Thornbury house. An IRA raid on the 
Coulsons’ farm near Clones resulted in the burning of the family home and the killing of 
Billy Fox, a Protestant member of the Irish Senate who was engaged to George Coulson’s 
sister, Marjorie. Four local republicans, including Seán and Michael Kinsella, were later 
convicted in relation to the attack. Even many IRA sympathisers were appalled by the killing 
of Fox and the attack on the Coulsons; the incident caused significant “loss of prestige” for 
the IRA south of the border.79 Both Leahy and Mulroe have argued persuasively that the 
incident led to a more “proactive stance” on the part of the Irish government in countering the 
IRA, including an increased Garda presence on the border.80 Tommy McNulty, who was an 
IRA volunteer in County Monaghan, later recalled the changed atmosphere: “The next 
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morning all hell broke loose in Co. Monaghan. There were Gardaí, Irish army and Special 
Branch everywhere.”  Several Monaghan republicans, including McNulty, were charged with 
IRA membership and jailed in the days in a security sweep after the killing of Billy Fox.81
Blowing up Belturbet: Loyalist Operations in County Cavan
At 1 a.m. on 21 November 1972, a Garda car was on a routine patrol towards Aghalane 
bridge, which separated County Cavan in the Republic of Ireland from County Fermanagh in 
Northern Ireland, found that the road was blocked by bales of hay 100 metres from the 
bridge. On top of the bales was a cardboard sign with the letters ‘BOM’ [sic]. Seconds after 
the patrol’s arrival there was a large explosion. The 19th century, 40 feet masonry arch bridge 
over the Woodford canal section of Lough Erne was badly damaged and a number of nearby 
houses had their windows shattered. The Irish customs hut was also nearly destroyed. 
Aghalane was part of a main, approved road linking the towns of Belturbet and Enniskillen in 
addition to wider regional traffic between the south of Ireland and north-west Ulster. Since 
early 1972, the area immediately to the north of the bridge had also been the site of a number 
of IRA ambushes.82  Exactly two months earlier, 53 year-old Tom Bullock, a popular local 
UDR part-time soldier, farmer and caretaker for the Earl of Erne, and his wife Emily were 
shot dead in their home by a cross-border IRA unit which had travelled the short distance 
across the Aghalane bridge to the Bullock farm.83 The killing of the Bullocks was particularly 
shocking; outraged unionists demanded a response from the British government including the 
closing of the bridge. However, the MOD and HQNI struggled to find a solution. They could 
not unilaterally close the road as it had been confirmed as an “approved” cross-border route 
five years previously. Only unapproved roads could be cratered and shut.84 
Captain Vernon Rees, the army officer responsible for security in south-west Fermanagh, 
believed that he found an answer to the problem of Aghalane Bridge. In an interview for the 
Imperial War Museum oral history archive, Rees recalled that shortly after the killing of the 
Bullocks he was introduced by a local RUC chief inspector to Jack Leahy, a 46-year-old 
publican and auctioneer, who he described as being a leading representative of the UDA in 
South Fermanagh. In Rees’s view, “… anybody who would help me defeat the IRA would be 
a friend of mine. And that in those days included the UDA.” Ultimately, he decided to 
cooperate with Jack Leahy as a response to the Bullock and other IRA killings.85 Leahy was 
originally from County Cavan; in the early 1950s he moved to Fermanagh, near the 
Drummully salient.86 In 1973 Lord Erne nominated Jack Leahy to successfully stand as an 
‘Unionist Unity’ candidate in the Fermanagh District Council elections (Unionist Unity was 
an anti-Sunningdale coalition linked to the Vanguard movement).87 After Leahy’s pub in the 
South Fermanagh town of Lisnaskea was bombed in 1972 both he and Lord Erne applied for 
planning permission related to the Wyvern Inn’s reconstruction.88 Leahy came to believe that, 
“the less roads you have for people to get in [to Fermanagh] and commit assassinations the 
better.”89 
Captain Rees recalled that he met with Jack Leahy at the Wyvern Inn shortly after the 
Bullocks’ death. By Rees’s account, Leahy asked him to ensure that his soldiers were kept 
outside the area of Aghalane bridge on the night/early morning of 20/21 November. Rees had 
a moment of uncertainty, “Am I about to cooperate with a terrorist in the Ulster Defence 
Association in the destruction of a main road in the United Kingdom?”90 Ultimately, Rees 
agreed to keep his soldiers away from the bridge. However, after the initial explosion on 21 
November, he realised that the bridge was not as badly damaged as he had hoped. Rees then 
ordered a reluctant RAOC bomb disposal non-commissioned officer to carry out a further 
explosion:
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I said … ‘I’m Captain Rees. I’m very glad you’ve come out to look at this. There’s 
some very unstable explosives up there and I don’t want it moved really. I want you 
to destroy it on the bridge.’ He went up and he came down and he said, ‘It’s mud.’ 
And I said, ‘No, no, it’s not mud. It’s unstable, homemade explosives.’ And he said, 
‘If I blow that up there, sir, it will blow the central arch down.’ And I said, ‘If that’s 
what happens, that’s what happens.’ And he said, ‘Are you telling me … ?’ And I 
said, ‘Go up there and clear that thing.’ Anyway, he blew it up with about a quarter of 
a pound of PE [plastic explosives]. Both the arches flew out and the central arch 
collapsed. Ten minutes later I go up and there is this inspector from the Gardaí who 
says, ‘What have you done?’91
Does Rees’s account tally with other evidence? In a draft reply to a question in the House of 
Lords the NIO offered some revealing information: “On 22 November at 1510 hrs, a routine 
Army patrol visited the scene and found 40 lbs of explosives under the bridge.  It was too 
dangerous to remove and at 1615 it was detonated in situ. The Garda had been notified and 
were present at the time....”92 The NIO version echoes at least some of the detail given by 
Rees, even it leaves out the ruse to further damage the bridge. 
The British Army’s most senior officer in Northern Ireland, Lieutenant General Harry Tuzo, 
made it clear to the NIO that he was “delighted” that the bridge had been blown up and 
wanted it to remain closed indefinitely.93 But, despite two explosions, the bridge remained 
substantially intact and Cavan County Council decided to erect a temporary bailey bridge 
until more permanent repairs could be undertaken. On hearing of these plans, Frank Steele, 
an NIO official seconded from MI6, asked the British Embassy in Dublin to notify the Irish 
government that the erection of a bridge without the consent of Fermanagh County Council 
(then unionist controlled) would be viewed as going against “courtesy and perhaps of law”.94 
Nevertheless, the Cavan local authorities proceeded to erect the bailey bridge and the road 
was reopened on 24 December 1972. John Brooke was outraged, describing the bailey bridge 
as “an invasion of United Kingdom territory by a foreign power.”95 
At approximately 9pm on the night of 28 December a red ford escort with at least two 
passengers, a young man and a woman, crossed the bailey bridge at Aghalane and made its 
way to the nearby town of Belturbet in County Cavan. An hour and a half later, the same car 
exploded on Main Street, Belturbet, killing two teenagers, Geraldine O’Reilly and Paddy 
Stanley. Twelve more people were injured, some seriously, including Geraldine O’Reilly’s 
brother who was waiting outside the takeaway. Multiple buildings and parked cars were 
damaged; the town postmaster Leonard McGovern thought, “the whole town had gone up”.96 
Some residents of the town were in no doubt as to why Belturbet was targeted, viewing it, 
“… as a reprisal for the opening of Aghalane Bridge … One man said that he had sat up for 
ten nights waiting for a bomb.”97 Clones and Pettigo were also targeted on the same night - 
two men were seriously injured in Clones - but Belturbet suffered the most. A local 
newspaper, the Fermanagh Herald concluded that local knowledge was vital in the execution 
of the attack but that explosives experts would have been brought in from outside the county 
to prepare the bombs.98 Garda intelligence and the subsequent Irish judicial report into the 
bombings thirty years later focused on one suspect, a loyalist paramilitary called Robert 
Bridge who lived near Enniskillen and was subsequently convicted of a sectarian murder.99 In 
recent years a former RUC inspector in Lisnaskea, Paddy McGuinness, recalled that he was 
concerned about a man who was staying in Bothwell’s Hotel (just across the street from the 
Wyvern Inn) at the time. This man was working on a contract given to a Newtownabbey, 
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County Antrim building firm, Laings, to construct a dairy factory in Lisnaskea. McGuinness 
believed that, at one point the suspect had built a poorly constructed bomb in Lisnaskea 
towards the end of 1972.100 
Forty years earlier, in March 1973, the British Army believed that they had identified a 
leading paramilitary in Fermanagh who they suspected was responsible for “recent 
bombings” across the border. He was not Robert Bridge, but he was from Newtownabbey. 
On 13 March William McMurray, Newtownabbey, County Antrim and James Campbell, 
with addresses in Derrygonnelly, County Fermanagh and Newtownabbey were charged with 
stealing £312 from a man in Derrygonnelly and the illegal possession of a Walther pistol and 
ammunition.101 Campbell, a native of south Donegal, was a former Northern Irish customs 
officer. In September 1972 an IRA ASU attacked Campbell’s customs post at Belleek, west 
Fermanagh, ordering Campbell and another colleague out of their hut before planting 
explosives which completely destroyed the customs building and damaged Campbell’s car.102 
At a court hearing in 1973 Billy McMurray described himself as the Belfast UDA’s liaison 
officer with Fermanagh and Tyrone.103 
British Army intelligence believed that Billy McMurray was an experienced and senior 
loyalist paramilitary, identifying him as “OC of a UDA Special ‘Commando’ Team”, from 
Belfast that was now operating in west Ulster. Another British Army intelligence report 
stated that McMurray was an associate of Robert Bridge (the latter was described as a 
lieutenant and possible one-time OC of the Fermanagh/Tyrone UDA). In early 1973 
McMurray was clearly regarded by the British Army as a driving force behind loyalist 
activity in Fermanagh and across the border during the months preceding his arrest in March 
1973.104 After the robbery at Derrygonnelly, a British Army intelligence report noted that, 
“Of the two men arrested for robbery at Derrygonnelly, one was a leading member of a UDA 
Commando type gang from Belfast who were believed responsible for various explosions in 
Eire [sic].” The report went on to note that, “Local UDA were not, however, a threat.”105 This 
is a poor assessment of the threat from the Fermanagh UDA during this period. Later that 
year another British Army intelligence report noted that they believed that Fermanagh 
members of the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) – a name also used by members of the UDA - 
were suspected of being responsible for the shooting of nationalist MP Frank McManus (the 
UFF also later claimed that they were behind the attack).106 
Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Millen, a senior staff officer at HQNI, believed that the 
Belturbet bombing helped to make the British case to permanently close the Aghalane 
Bridge, stating that, “ …these incidents should encourage the Republic’s authorities to 
support our wish to leave the road physically (opposed from legally) closed.”107 John Brooke, 
while extending his sympathy to the victims, also noted that the unilateral reopening of the 
bridge at Aghalane by Cavan County Council meant that loyalists could just as easily use that 
route to inflict terror on the people in Cavan as the IRA did when attacking targets in 
Fermanagh. Brooke hoped that Irish government policy would now change.108 In the early 
morning of 11 January Aghalane bridge was again blown up, rendering it once more 
unusable. The bomb was powerful enough to rip out the steel girders of the bailey bridge and 
it was also connected to another device that had been placed in the Irish customs hut.109 
The Fermanagh nationalist MP John Carron urged the Irish government not to give in to the 
threat from loyalism. The bridge was a vital economic link; the Irish government should not 
be bullied: “Defy them to do it again. Let the bridge be restored and give the bomb merchants 
the message, ‘Right, try it again.’”110 No further attempt was made to repair the bridge. South 
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of the border politicians and businessmen in Cavan and Monaghan sharply criticized security 
measures in the wake of the loyalist bombings. In Belturbet and Clones vigilante groups were 
formed; local leaders demanded a much greater Garda presence. Belturbet’s Town 
Commissioners sent a request to the Irish government for a 24-hour presence by the Irish 
Defence Forces on the remaining nearby border crossing. Locals also urged the Irish security 
forces to rigorously check vehicles “the same as they were doing in Northern Ireland”. Under 
pressure, the Irish government responded by stepping up its security presence in the border 
area near Belturbet. There was a significant increase in Irish police and army checks on 
border crossings in the weeks after the bombings of 28 December.111 
Conclusion
This article has shown the impact of rural loyalist mobilization and the resulting border 
campaign in shaping the conflict in the early Troubles. Loyalist terrorism worked, up to a 
point. The Irish peer Lord Kilbracken astutely observed in a speech to the House of Lords in 
1977 that it was “…  remarkable that the destruction of a bridge by terrorist forces should be 
considered an act which is indispensable for security purposes.”112 IRA access to south 
Fermanagh became more difficult since the Irish authorities did not attempt to reopen 
Aghalane bridge after January 1973 and increased security on other border crossings. 
Loyalists targeted a number of suspected IRA safe houses or staging posts in the Drummully 
salient, eliminating at least one arms dump in the process. The loyalist attack on the 
Thornbury house at Legnakelly precipitated a series of events that undermined the IRA in 
County Monaghan, namely the burning of the Coulson home and the killing of Senator Billy 
Fox, which prompted the Irish government to increase security operations in Monaghan. IRA 
activity in the Clones area never recovered to the levels seen before 1974. By 1975 the 
British government noted that the IRA had suffered “considerable attrition” in the border 
region at the hands of the Irish state.113 
Tactical gains against the IRA must, however, be weighed up against the lasting damage to 
the reputation of the British state as a result of the loyalist border campaign. Suspicions over 
the links between the security forces and attacks by loyalist paramilitaries diverted attention 
away from IRA atrocities such as the murders of the Bullocks. A local newspaper, the 
Fermanagh Herald summed up the response of the nationalist community, “People are not 
fools. They see Unionist terrorists doing pretty well what they please. Until the British Army 
takes stern and decisive action against the military organisations of the Unionists it may 
forget completely about being accepted as a reputable security force…”114 Republican 
sympathies, or at least a pronounced sense of grievance and resentment of the British state, 
endured in Cavan and Monaghan, contributing to the election of IRA Volunteer and hunger-
striker Kieran Doherty to the Irish parliament’s lower house, Dáil Éireann in 1981.115 There 
is considerable potential for further work on loyalist networks in rural Ulster, including 
loyalism’s complex relationship with the state, intelligence and the exchange of violence with 
the IRA. The capacity for agency among low or mid-ranking representatives of the state, as 
evidenced in the account of Captain Rees, suggests that the study of deviance could be a 
fruitful means of investigating collusion in Northern Ireland and elsewhere.
Since the British Army and the RUC were competing with the IRA for influence and 
information within the Catholic population, the suspicion among nationalists that the security 
forces were unresponsive to, and possibly even facilitating, loyalist paramilitary violence can 
only have damaged the state’s objective of winning trust. Such misgivings have, to some 
extent, been corroborated in this article. The British Army had valuable intelligence on a 
UDA ‘commando’ unit which it believed was responsible for bombings in the Republic of 
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Ireland. Neither the British Army nor the RUC appear to have passed this information to the 
Irish police investigation into murders at Belturbet. Moreover, the security forces’ attitude 
towards the activities of DOW / representatives of the UUP involved in paramilitary activity 
was indulgent and inept. Personal contacts and institutional relationships between serving 
members of the security forces with their former comrades, such as Peter Brush and Bill 
Hannigan, were confused for assurances of good behavior. More questions should have been 
asked about whether British intelligence was being leaked to loyalists; as seen in the evidence 
presented here, the timings of 3 Brigade intelligence findings and subsequent loyalist 
operations could be alarmingly close. Instead of being angered by successive bombings at 
Aghalane and Belturbet, some British officials believed that such attacks were to the 
government’s advantage. At a junior level, in the case of Aghalane Bridge, there is significant 
evidence of direct collusion between the British Army and loyalist paramilitaries. Eventually 
a number of loyalists who were operating in rural areas, including Robert Bridge and Bill 
Hannigan, were arrested and convicted. But, to some extent, it was too late. The reputation of 
the British state had been badly damaged by a tardy and incoherent response to loyalist 
terrorism along the border. 
1 “Report from OC 3 Inf. Coy Group to Comd. Intelligence Offr.”, Western Command, 
January 17 1972, 2004/15/81, Military Archives of Ireland, Dublin [hereafter MAI]. 
2 Impartial Reporter [County Fermanagh Newspaper], March 9 1972.
3 Impartial Reporter, November 3 1972; and Impartial Reporter, November 9 1972.
4 Impartial Reporter, November 3 1972; and Impartial Reporter, November 9 1972.
5 Anthony Craig, A Crisis of Confidence: Anglo-Irish Relations in the Early Troubles, 1966-
1974 (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2010), 186.
6 Shaun McDaid, Template for Peace: Northern Ireland, 1972-1975 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2013), 154-181.
7 Thomas Leahy, “Informers, Agents, the IRA and British Counter-Insurgency Strategy 
during the Northern Ireland Troubles, 1969 to 1998” (PhD Thesis, King’s College London, 
2015), 184-185.
8 Patrick Mulroe, Bomb’s Bullets and the Border (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2019), 227-
228. 
9 Ibid.
10 Richard English, Does Terrorism Work? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 9-12.
11 Ibid.
12 “Robert Simpson: Representations against Internment Order.”, HA/5/962B, Public Record 
Office of Northern Ireland [hereafter PRONI].
13 Richard English, Terrorism: How to Respond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 24.
14 Brian Hanley, The Impact of the Troubles in the Republic of Ireland (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2018).
15 Henry Patterson, Ireland’s Violent Frontier (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). 
16 See, for example, Anne Cadwallader, Lethal Allies (Cork: Mercier Press, 2013); and 
Margaret Urwin, A State in Denial (Cork: Mercier Press, 2016).
17 Amy Grubb, “Microlevel Dynamics of Violence: Explaining Variation in Violence among 
Rural Districts during Northern Ireland’s Troubles,” Security Studies 25, no. 3 (2016): 464.
Page 14 of 18
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ftpv  Email: ftpv-peerreview@journals.tandf.co.uk





























































For Peer Review Only
15
18 Steve Bruce, The Red Hand: Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1992), 15.
19 Richard Reed, Paramilitary Loyalism: Identity and Change (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2015); James McAuley, The Politics of Identity: A Loyalist Community in 
Belfast (Amersham: Avebury Press, 1994); and Bruce, (see note 9 above).
20 Grubb, (See note 8 above), 464.
21 Stathis Kalyvas, “The Urban Bias in Research on Civil Wars,” Security Studies 13, no. 3 
(2004), 160-190.
22 Jim Cusack and Henry McDonald, UVF (Dublin: Poolbeg Press, 1997), 271.
23 Mark McGovern, Counterinsurgency and Collusion in Northern Ireland (London: Pluto, 
2019), 4.
24 Edward Burke, An Army of Tribes: British Army Cohesion, Deviancy and Murder in 
Northern Ireland (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2018), 12.
25 For a description of CESA see, James Hughes, ‘State Violence in the Origins of 
Nationalism: British Counterinsurgency and the Rebirth of Irish Nationalism’, in John Hall 
and Sinisa Malesevic, Nationalism and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 
112.
26 “Shooting Statistics for the period 1971-1977”, CJ 4/1764, The National Archives, London 
[hereafter TNA].
27 “Intelligence Summary No. 11/72 for the period 9 May–16 May 1972”: 3 Brigade, WO 
305/4209, TNA.
28 “Intelligence Summary No. 32/73 for the period 6 August–13 August 1973,” 3 Brigade, 
WO 305/4216, TNA.
29 Impartial Reporter, October 12 1972.
30 Impartial Reporter, March 16 1972.
31 Impartial Reporter, August 24 1972.
32 Impartial Reporter, July 20 1972.
33 Impartial Reporter, October 26 1972; and Impartial Reporter, November 23 1972.
34 Impartial Reporter, October 12 1972.
35 “Letter from R.A. Custis, Ministry of Defence to R.T. Armstrong, Prime Minister’s Office, 
17 March 1972,” FCO 87/31, TNA; “3 Infantry Brigade Intelligence Summary No. 30/73 for 
the period 23 July – 30 July 1973”, 3 Brigade, WO 305/4215, TNA.
36 “RUC/Army/UDR Coordination”, Memo by Brigadier Peter Bush, January 16 1973, WO 
305/4210, TNA. 
37 Ibid.
38 “Directive on Security Forces Reactions to Protestant Activity”, 3 Infantry Brigade, June 
17 1972, WO 305/4209, TNA.
39 “Intelligence Summary No. 44/73 for the period 29 October 1973 – 5 November 1973”, 3 
Brigade, WO 305/4219, TNA.
40 Belfast Telegraph, February 22 1978
41 Irish Times, November 4 1973
42 Belfast Telegraph, June 15 1970; and Impartial Reporter, April 19 1974.
43 Lieutenant Colonel Edward James Augustus Howard ‘Peter’ Brush, “Rifle Green, Orange 
Flash”, Unpublished Memoir [circa early 1980s], Private Papers of Lieutenant Colonel EJAH 
Brush, Document 3525) Imperial War Museum, London.
44 Ibid, 167.
45 Court file of John Steele, William John Hannigan, William Lightbody, Samuel Wallace 
McCullough, James Steele, William Robert Steele, 1978-1979, CRCT/3/2/1/316, PRONI.
46 Ibid.
Page 15 of 18
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ftpv  Email: ftpv-peerreview@journals.tandf.co.uk





























































For Peer Review Only
16
47 “Intelligence Summary No. 48/73 for the period 26 November – 3 December 1973,” 3 
Brigade, WO/4220, TNA.
48 The UDA was the other organisation mentioned as being possibly the owner (or the 
intended customer) of the weapons. “Intelligence Summary No. 39/73 for the period 24 
September – 1 October 1973”, October 1973, WO 305/4218, TNA.
49 “Intelligence Summary No. 15/73 for the period 9 April – 16 April 1973”, 3 Brigade, WO 
305/4212, TNA; “Intelligence Summary No. 34/73 for the period 20 August – 27 August 
1973,” 3 Brigade, WO 305/4216, TNA.
50 “Intelligence Summary No. 33/73 for the period 13 August – 20 August 1973,” 3 Brigade, 
WO 305/4216, TNA. 
51 “Intelligence Summary No. 27/73 for the period 10 July – 17 July 1973,” 3 Brigade, 
305/4215, TNA.
52 “Intelligence Summary No. 48/73 for the period 26 November – 3 December 1973” (See 
note 38 above).
53 “Intelligence Summary No. 41/73 for the period 8 October – 15 October 1973”, 3 Brigade 
HQ, October 1973, WO 305/4218, TNA.
54 Belfast Telegraph May 28 1980; “Infantry Intelligence Summary No. 34/73 for the period 
20 August – 27 August 1973,” 3 Brigade, WO 305/4216, TNA.
55 Belfast Telegraph, May 25 1976. 
56 Belfast Telegraph, October 27 1979.
57 Ibid.
58 Court file (see note 36 above).
59 See Jonathan McCormick, “A Directory of Murals - Album 5”, CAIN, last modified June 2 
2019, accessed December 16 2019, https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/mccormick/album51.htm
60 Brush (see note 34 above), 22.
61 Brush (see note 34 above), 222.
62 “Headquarters 3 Infantry Intelligence Summary No. 41/73 for the period 8 October – 15 
October 1973”, 3 Brigade, WO 305/4218, TNA.
63 “Intelligence Summary No. 43/73 for the period 22 October – 29 October”, 3 Brigade, WO 
305/4218, TNA. 
64 Telegram from HQNI, November 16 1973, published by Broken Elbow, accessed 
November 9 2019, https://thebrokenelbow.com/2014/02/06/the-british-armys-war-with-
garda-sgt-mcardle-a-collusion-controversy-from-the-1970s/ 
65 Northern Standard, November 16 1973.
66 Anglo-Celt, November 16 1973.
67 Northern Standard, November 16 1973.
68 Magill, October 1 1984.
69 “Intelligence Summary No. 48/73 for the period 26 November – 3 December” (see note 38 
above).
70 Northern Standard, April 7 1972.
71 “Telegram from Sir John Peck to Sir Frank Steele,” April 28 1972, FCO 87/119, TNA. 
72 Hansard, 348 No. 425, December 19 1973 (London: HM Stationary Office, 1973).
73 “Sabotage Attempts in Republic of Ireland 18/5/73-28/12/73,” 2004/16/82, MAI.
74 “Intelligence Summary, 21 December to 31 December 1973,” 3 Brigade, WO 305/4220, 
TNA.
75 “Sabotage Attempts in Republic of Ireland 18/5/73-28/12/73”, (see note 64 above).
76 Northern Standard, February 1 1974.
77 Impartial Reporter, August 1 1994.
78 Belfast Telegraph, October 6 1972.
Page 16 of 18
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ftpv  Email: ftpv-peerreview@journals.tandf.co.uk





























































For Peer Review Only
17
79 Mulroe, (See Note 3 above), 157.
80 Leahy, (See Note 3 above), 92; Mulroe, (See note 3 above), 157.
81 Thomas Anthony McNulty, Exiled (Dublin: Brunswick Press, 2013), 112-13.
82 Anglo-Celt, November 24 1972. 
83 Ibid.
84 “Telegram: Aghalane Bridge,” October 4 1972, FCO 87/120, TNA. 
85 Recording of Major Vernon Rees, OC Alkmaar Troop, A Battery (Chestnut Troop), 1st 
Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery, Sound Archive (Acquisition Number, 27067), Imperial 
War Museum, London, accessed March 28 2019.
86 David Leahy, A History of the Cavan Leahys Volume 2 (Bristol: David Leahy, 2018); 247-
248.
87 Fermanagh Herald, May 12 1973.
88 “Minutes - Meeting of the Planning Committee of Fermanagh County Council”, December 
6 1972, D3004/C/5/22, PRONI. 
89 ‘The Border’, BBC Spotlight, (1974: BBC), BBC Archives, accessed December 16 2019.
90 Recording of Major Vernon Rees (see note 76 above).
91 Rees, (see note 76 above).
92 Letter from J T A Howard-Drake to J T Williams, December 20 1972, CAB 9N/52, 
PRONI.
93 Letter from GOC to Harold Black, Office of the Secretary of State, December 28 1972, 
CAB 9N/52, PRONI.
94 Memo by Harold Black, December 19 1972, CAB 9N/52, PRONI.
95 Impartial Reporter, December 21 1972. 
96 Anglo-Celt, January 5 1973.
97 Ibid.
98 Fermanagh Herald, January 3 1973.
99 While singling out, and even naming, Robert Bridges [sic] as being a lead suspect in the 
cross-border bombings of 28 December 1972, the Barron report did point to other suspects, 
including two customs officers at Belleek, County Fermanagh, who Gardaí believed may 
have been involved in a later bombing on September 28 1973 (perhaps not coincidentally 28 
September is Ulster Day). Oireachtas Debates, January 27 2005, 
https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/joint_committee_on_justice_equality_defence_a
nd_womens_rights/2005-01-27/2/, accessed December 16 2019.
100 PSNI HET Report Concerning the Murder of Louis Alphonsus Leonard (copy in the 
author’s possession – I am grateful to the Leonard family for making this available), 39; 
Belfast Telegraph, June 23 1975.
101 Belfast Telegraph, May 18 1973.
102 Impartial Reporter, September 23 1972.
103 Belfast Telegraph, May 17 1973.
104 “Intelligence Summary No. 40/73 for the period 1 October – 8 October 1973,” 3 Brigade, 
WO 305/4218, TNA; “Intelligence Summary No. 14/73 for the period 2 April to 9 April 
1973,” 3 Brigade, WO 305/4212, TNA.
105 “Minutes of the Western Security Committee Meeting”, March 29 1973, 3 Brigade, WO 
305/4212, TNA. 
106 “Intelligence Summary No. 40/73 for the period 1 October – 8 October 1973”, 3 Brigade, 
WO 305/4218, TNA; and Fermanagh Herald, September 22 1973; 
107 Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Millen to S C Jackson, NIO, January 1 1973, 
CAB 9N/52, PRONI.
108 Fermanagh Herald, January 3 1973; and Anglo-Celt, January 5 1973.
Page 17 of 18
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ftpv  Email: ftpv-peerreview@journals.tandf.co.uk





























































For Peer Review Only
18
109 Fermanagh Herald, January 29 1973.
110 Ibid.
111 Anglo-Celt, January 5 1973.
112 Hansard, 387 No. 1022, 24 November 1977 (London: HM Stationary Office, 1977).
113 Mulroe, (See note 3 above), 157.
114 Fermanagh Herald, April 6 1974.
115 Irish News, August 9 2019.
Page 18 of 18
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ftpv  Email: ftpv-peerreview@journals.tandf.co.uk
Terrorism and Political Violence
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
